Новости / Семинар НИУ ВШЭ «Инструменты экономического анализа нарушений антимонопольного законодательства на многосторонних рынках»

Докладчик: Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)

Язык семинара: английский

Семинар состоится 11 апреля 2019 г. в 12.00 по адресу: Здание НИУ ВШЭ на Шаболовке 26/4, аудитория 1302.

Если Вам нужен пропуск в НИУ ВШЭ, просьба до 17:00 10 апреля отправить  e-mail Анциферовой Оксане на адрес oantsiferova@hse.ru. Для прохода в здание НИУ ВШЭ при себе необходимо иметь  паспорт .

Аннотация: Multi-sided platforms are ubiquitous business in many sectors, particularly in digital markets, taking advantage of the internet communications and information power. These multi-sided, often two-sided, provide an opportunity for users of both sides to interact and solve, in many cases informational problems that hindered transactions. The two-sided markets are often characterized by the presence of network externalities across sides of the platforms. In other words the attractiveness of doing business with the platform on one side depends on the number of users of the other side and vice versa.

These characteristics of multisided platform generate the need to adapt the tools of competition policy analysis, both for merger and for abuse of dominance control. The cross-network effects influence demand and pricing such that they require practitioners to adapt the relevant market delineation and inferences on market power, either by concentration measures or with price pressure indices in merger analysis. The network effects, pricing rules and the innovation based characteristics of many of these platforms impose careful analysis in abuse of dominance cases, particularly price-cost comparisons. As many platforms create new markets and are innovation intensive businesses, usual approaches of analysis for dynamic competition take center stage.

We explore these issues, providing suggestions for authorities and practitioners. The main topics to be discussed:

• Basic dimensions and differences between two-sided or multi-sided platforms firms and markets and one sided markets for competition policy analysis.
• Delimiting markets and measuring market power in two-sided markets:  the adjustments in Critical Loss Analysis for market delineation,
• The role of concentration for market power inference
• Modified GUPPI to unilateral effects assessment
• Tests for exclusionary abuses